Introduction
The central question in the economic analysis of climate change policy concerns the degree to which current consumption should be reduced to avoid or mitigate future costs of climate change. In answering this question, two issues that must be addressed are how to discount losses incurred far in the future and how to deal with substantial uncertainty about these losses. Much of the discussion stimulated by the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change (Stern, 2007) revolved around the first of these issues (Dasgupta, 2007; Nordhaus, 2007) . This paper focuses on the second.
Although there remains little if any uncertainty about the reality of anthropogenic climate change, substantial uncertainty surrounds key aspects of it. For example, under one emissions scenario from the most recent assessment by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2007) , there is a 2/3 probability that mean global surface temperature will increase by 2.4-6.4°C by 2100 with a remaining 1/3 probability that the increase will fall outside this range. The corresponding ranges of welfare effects and society's willingness to pay to avoid them are likely to be very wide and there is a need to balance the risks of under-and over-reacting.
The standard economic calculus for decision-making under uncertainty rests on consideration of the expected discounted welfare or utility change. In the face of risk aversion, expected discounted utility can be sensitive to the upper tail of the probability 2 distribution of future temperature change. This point has been made most forcefully by Weitzman (2008) , who argued that this calculus essentially falls apart in the case of climate change. Briefly, using a theoretical result of Geweke (2001) , Weitzman showed that the combination of a heavy-tailed probability distribution for temperature change and a common model of risk aversion implies an infinite expected discounted welfare loss.
Although Weitzman was inexplicit about specific policy implications of this result, he criticized analyses such as Nordhaus (2008) pointing to a moderate response.
A necessary (but not sufficient) condition for Weitzman's result is that the upper tail of the distribution of temperature change is unbounded. The purpose of this paper is to explore the effect of placing an upper bound on temperature change. Weitzman argued strenuously against this kind of truncation, claiming that the truncation point must perforce be arbitrary and that the results would therefore be highly sensitive to this arbitrary choice. As discussed below, we disagree with the first of these points and we show that -whether or not the choice of truncation point is arbitrary -the second point is not correct.
Model
We next sketch out the model under which the analysis will proceed. This model is highly stylized. Stylized models are used in economics, atmospheric science, and other fields to develop and sharpen qualitative insights. For example, Roe & Baker (2007) used a stylized model of climate feedback to explain the difficulty of reducing 3 uncertainty about temperature sensitivity. The model outlined here mirrors the general set-up of Weitzman and others. Let ) (s T denote the temperature increase at time s in the future. We assume that:
Under this model, temperature increases linearly until time o s at which point temperature levels off at a final increase of τ . We will assume that o s is known and focus on uncertainty in τ . Adopting a Bayesian perspective, this uncertainty can be expressed through a probability density function ) (τ f , about which more below. Let ) (s C be consumption at time s, normalized so that current consumption is 1. In the absence of temperature change, consumption increases at rate g. In this model, increasing temperature adversely affects consumption, e.g. through adversely affecting health or by decreasing economic productivity. We assume that the proportion of consumption retained is:
so that consumption is given by:
Economists measure the welfare that society gains by consumption through a utility function. Among other things, the shape of the utility function determines the degree of risk aversion held by society. A risk averse utility function implies that uncertainty over future temperature is costly and would lead us to reduce emissions today, even if the expected cost of climate change is modest. Following Weitzman and others, we adopt the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function: 
where 0 > δ is the pure rate of time discounting (Dasgupta, 2007) .
The uncertainty in τ propagates to utility. Let
be certain utility at time s for fixed τ . The expected discounted utility is given by:
The inner integral represents discounted utility for fixed τ and the outer integral averages this over the distribution of τ . The absent bounds on the outer integral correspond to the range of τ over which
A central question concerns the willingness of society to pay to avoid the expected loss in utility associated with climate change. Following Weitzman (2008) , one way to measure this is by the fraction θ of consumption that society would be willing to forego in perpetuity to avoid this loss in utility. Let:
be the certain discounted utility if utility is reduced by a factor θ at each time and climate change is avoided (i.e., 0 = τ ). The optimal value opt θ of θ is found by equating (6) and (7).
Some results
The model outlined above includes an economic component and a climate component.
As a base case on the economic side, we take 0 = δ , g = 0.015, and 2 = η , which imply a discount rate of 3%. The specification of these parameters was discussed by Dasgupta On the climate side, we calibrate the base case by referring to the A1F1 scenario of the IPCC (2007). Under this scenario, which is the most pessimistic of the IPCC, the 'best estimate' is a warming of 4°C between the baseline period 1980-1999 and 2090-2099 with a 'likely range' of 2.4-6.4°C. To capture this scenario in a rough way, we take o s to be 100 years in the future and assume that τ has a Cauchy distribution, shifted to have a mode at 4.4°C and truncated on the left at 0°C. The Cauchy distribution -which corresponds to the Student t distribution with 1 degree of freedom -is the canonical heavy tailed distribution. For this distribution, the probability that τ lies between 2.4°C and 6.4°C is approximately 0.75, which is slightly larger than the value of 0.67 given by IPCC (2007) . In the sequel, we will truncate this distribution at relatively high levels of τ . This truncation has minimal effect on this probability.
As guaranteed by the results of Geweke (2001) 
Discussion
The effects of climate change on mankind are uncertain. Previous authors have argued that this uncertainty essentially paralyzes our ability to conduct analysis of the appropriate response. Adopting a stylized model with economic and climate components, we have explored the consequences of bounding uncertainty over future temperature increases from climate change. We find that the optimal level of response to climate change, as measured by the factor opt θ , is relatively stable over a wide range of upper bounds on the uncertainty about future warming. This finding is important because it implies that there is no need to establish a precise upper bound, and may help refocus debate on the appropriate level of mitigation.
The question remains whether it is reasonable to bound uncertainty about future climate change. We believe that it is. Specifically, temperature sensitivity -and hence future warming -can be constrained by empirical studies of the actual temperature response to changes in radiative forcing in both the modern and geological records (REFS). Although such studies have not been aimed directly at establishing an upper bound on temperature sensitivity -indeed, some have been aimed at establishing a lower
bound -values admitting a temperature increase in the range of 20-50° can be ruled out.
Finally, as noted, truncating ) (τ f is sufficient, but not necessary to avoid the result of Weitzman (2008) : the result is also avoided if the tail of declines at a faster than polynomial rate. We have focused here on the effect of truncation for the technical reason that the latter result can only be achieved under the Bayesian model of Weitzman (2008) by altering the standard non-informative prior distribution for τ . While a slavish 9 adherence to standard priors is no virtue, it is on a scientific understanding of climate change and not the form of a non-informative (and therefore non-scientific) prior that we have focused.
